Parking at and around downtown shopping malls by İnan, Murat Oluş & Inan, Murat Olus
PARKING AT AND AROUND DOWNTOWN SHOPPING
MALLS
by
Murat Oluş İnan
Submitted to the Social Sciences Institute
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Sabancı University
July 2015

© Murat Oluş İnan 2015
All Rights Reserved
Acknowledgements
First of all, I am grateful to my thesis advisor Eren İnci for his guidance throughout
myM.A. degree. I am thankful to him since he has helpedmewith myM.A. thesis with his
valuable and insightful suggestions, encouraged me when the difficulties I faced seemed
impossible to overcome, believed inme from the beginning and trainedme for my doctoral
studies in many respects. I also thank my thesis jury members, Sadettin Haluk Çitçi and
Şerif Aziz Şimşir, for examining my thesis.
I am thankful to TUBITAK, The Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey, for its financial support.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family who have supported me throughout my
life and always trusted my decisions. My special thanks to my dear mother who always
believes in me, even at times that I do not believe in myself.
v
PARKING AT AND AROUND DOWNTOWN SHOPPING MALLS
Murat Oluş İnan
Economics, M.A. Thesis, 2015
Thesis Supervisor: Eren İnci
Keywords: economics of parking; shopping mall parking; spillover parking; traffic
congestion
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the parking behaviors of individuals at and around downtown
shopping malls. I express a real life parking problem where a sequential game is played
between the mall and individuals, and I model the problem. In the model, the mall decides
the price of the good, the parking fee, and the capacity of the mall, then individuals decide
to park either at the mall or the curbside. Individuals are determined endogenously ac-
cording to their valuations of the good that the monopolist shopping mall has produced. I
determined the equilibrium and also solved for the social optimum where a social planner
controls the parking fee. I find that both the equilibrium and social optimum parking fees
are positive. Moreover, the socially optimum parking fee is higher than the equilibrium
parking fee.
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ŞEHİR İÇİ ALIŞVERİŞ MERKEZLERİNDE VE ÇEVRESİNDE PARKLANMA
Murat Oluş İnan
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015
Tez Danışmanı: Eren İnci
Anahtar Kelimeler: park ekonomisi; alışveriş merkezi; park yeri ücreti; taşan
parklanma; trafik sıkışıklığı
Özet
Bu tezde, bireylerin şehir içi alışveriş merkezlerindeki park etme davranışlarına
odaklanılmaktadır. Gerçek hayatta bireyler ve alışveriş merkezi arasında ardışık bir oyun
şeklinde gerçekleşen bir park etme problemimodellenmektedir. Modelde alışverişmerkezi
ürün fiyatına, park yeri ücretine ve otopark alanının kapasitesine karar vermektedir, daha
sonra ise bireyler alışveriş merkezine ya da yol kenarına park etmeye karar vermektedirler.
Bireyler model içerisinde alışveriş merkezinin ürettiği ürüne verdikleri değere göre belir-
lenmektedir. Dengeyi belirlerlemekle birlikte problemi sosyal bir planlayıcının park yeri
ücretini kontrol ettiği durum için de çözdüm. Sonuç olarak hem dengedeki hem de toplum
için optimal olan otopark yeri ücretleri pozitif olmaktadır. Dahası toplum için optimal olan
park yeri ücreti dengedekinden daha büyük bir değer almaktadır.
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1 Introduction
The motivation for this paper is a parking price policy enforced by the city of Istanbul and
the subsequent conflict between mall owners and the city council. The city pronounced in
2007 that the first three hours of shopping mall parking must be free to prevent spillover
parking and traffic congestion. However, mall owners opposed this new order since they
suffer from low gain from parking space and negative externalities of residents who enjoy
free parking slots. Therefore, mall owners took this case to the administrative court of
Istanbul and the court decided that malls can charge a parking fee. However, the conflict
had not ended yet. The state council of Turkey (DANIŞTAY) reversed the judgment and
decided that the first three hours of parking spaces must be free for all people. During this
decision process all approaches were from a political or legal perspective and we cannot
say that there were economical analyses that affected the final judgment. Thus, throughout
this paper I seek an answer of the question ”is a free parking fee at downtown malls better
for society?”.
This paper examines the effects of a downtown shopping mall on the parking behav-
ior of individuals and externalities imposed on society in various aspects. While integrat-
ing on-street parking with shopping mall parking, I also analyze the spillover parking and
traffic congestion effects. In the model, where there are a residential area and a downtown
shoppingmall, individuals decide to park at the mall or curbside, and they come to the mall
by car. First, I analyze the equilibrium parking fee without any intervention of the city
council. Then, I analyze the socially optimal parking fee when the city chooses the parking
fee and make a comparison between the equilibrium and socially optimal parking fees. In
this paper, I determined the equilibrium parking fee and socially optimal parking fee when
the city behaves as a social planner and both the equilibrium and city’s socially optimal
parking fees are always positive. Moreover, I show that the socially optimal parking fee
is lower than the equilibrium parking fee.
Shopping mall parking is a highly new area in the economics of parking. As far
as I know, Hasker and Inci (2014) is the first attempt to analyze shopping mall parking
behavior. They focus on suburban shopping malls and show that providing free parking
for consumers is socially optimal. Even though suburban malls allocate large amounts of
space to provide parking lots, they embed the costs of parking in the prices of goods by
providing parking free. In their model there is a risk-neutral monopolist shopping mall
which sells a good and the only way to reach the mall is by car. Their innovation in the
model is that people who cannot find their desired goods at the shopping mall go back
home empty-handed. In this case, charging a parking fee becomes a punishment to people
who cannot find their desired good. To insure these individuals, the shopping mall embeds
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the parking fee in the price of goods that it sells, and charges a zero fee for parking. They
show that this result is also the second-best social optimum, and moreover it holds either
that the monopoly mall has competitive monopoly power and prices competitively or there
is parking validation or a trade-off between shopping and parking spaces. In the extensions
section of the paper, they briefly analyze the parking fee in urban areas which is highly
relevant to my research. They find that if there is a high enough probability of customers
to be able to purchase the good, then the equilibrium parking fee is positive.
Ersoy, Hasker, and Inci (2015) use a similar model to Hasker and Inci (2014); how-
ever, it can be differentiated in three main aspects. Firstly, in Ersoy, Hasker, and Inci
(2015) there is a mode choice to come to the mall. Individuals come to the mall either by
car or public transportation. Secondly, none of the modes cause traffic congestion which
implicitly assumes that the shopping mall is in a suburban area. Thirdly, unlike Hasker
and Inci (2014), they guarantee that shoppers can find their desired goods at the mall with
certainty. Therefore, this assumption eliminates the insurance motive of the mall and em-
phasizes the direct effects of public transportation that are added to the model. They find
that parking again can be free. Furthermore, even in cases where the parking fee is posi-
tive, the equilibrium parking fee is always less than the marginal cost of the parking space.
Therefore, whether the parking fee is zero or positive, the mall always employs loss-leader
pricing, and they show that this can even be socially optimal.
There are three main differences between the model that I introduce and Hasker and
Inci (2014)’s model. Firstly, in their model shopping malls have to provide parking spaces
to the shoppers and the shoppers can only park at the mall’s parking lot. However, in my
model, the shopping mall does not have to provide a parking space. It decides the quantity
of space. Moreover, individuals who come to the mall also have another option; they can
park curbside and they can cause spillover parking and traffic congestion. Secondly, in
Hasker and Inci (2014) all individuals who need to park are shoppers; there is no other
type of individual (residents) who can use parking spaces. In mymodel, there are residents
who can park either at the mall or curbside, and they can also prevent more shoppers from
coming to the mall; therefore the mall should also consider the residents in parking fee
decisions and the capacity of the parking space. The aim of these two assumptions is
to represent a daily spillover parking problem in downtown areas. Shoppers who park
curbside and residents who park at the mall can cause misallocation and efficiency loss.
While the parking fee is increasing, individuals tend to park curbside, and while parking
fee is decreasing they tend to park at the mall. In this paper I also analyze the allocations
of shoppers and residents in the equilibrium. The third difference is the same as Ersoy,
Inci and Hasker’s (2015) model; shoppers can find the goods that they wanted for sure.
Therefore, by eliminating the insurance motive of the mall, I emphasize the direct effects
of the parking behavior of shoppers and residents over spillover parking traffic congestion.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Sec-
tion 3 sets up the model and derives the equilibrium, the allocations of individuals and the
social optimum. Section 4 concludes. An appendix contains some details and proofs.
2 Literature Review
The study of the economics of parking mainly started to grow in the early 1990’s. Al-
though there were several papers about parking before the 1990’s, transportation eco-
nomics did not pay much attention to the parking behavior of individuals. Vickrey’s
(1969) paper can be serve as an example of a pioneering work which introduces a time
varying parking fee as a substitute of congestion pricing. In this section, I review some of
the papers that create infrastructure of economics of parking.
Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld (1995) argue that the literature mainly agrees on
road pricing as the first option in regulating traffic. Therefore, they introduce the possi-
bilities of parking policies in traffic regulation as the alternatives to road pricing. They
analyze the two fundamental parking policies, which are regulations on parking prices and
restrictions on the supply of parking spaces, and compare them. They make three main
assumptions to highlight the relationship between parking and mobility. An equal length
of urban road is driven by individuals in their trips; traffic congestion is equally distributed
in the urban area; and the government is the single authority in controlling parking spaces.
Although parking fees and supply restrictions are not mutually exclusive, they show that
time dependent parking fees are superior when these policies of parking are equivalent
to road pricing. They then construct a spatial parking model and analyze the problem of
constant regulatory parking policies while the lengths of trips are varied. They show that
this problem can be solved when a proper spatial pattern of parking fees is specified and
individuals respond to differentiation of parking fees.
Arnott and Rowse (1999) construct a simple stochastic model of parking conges-
tion that examines the driver’s search for an available parking space on a circular road.
In their model, the mean density of available parking spaces is endogenously determined.
The demand of individuals for parking is derived from their demand for trips, and trip op-
portunities are assumed to be exogenous, stochastic and time invariant. For the simplicity
of the model, they do not include the flow congestion of cars and also assume spatial and
temporal homogeneity. Despite these simplifications, they reach highly complex results
because of the stocasticity of the model. They need stochasticity due to the existence of
cruising for parking and to evaluate parking information systems that are used by many
cities. They examine the equilibrium with no parking fee and the social optimum. They
3
also examine for the equilibrium with a parking fee. They then analyze the decentraliza-
tion of the social optimum by using the parking fee. In their model, each driver contributes
to parking congestion externality because drivers ignore the fact that their parking affects
the mean density of parking spaces, and authors find that the equilibrium parking fee is
equal to the negative externality of parking congestion.
Anderson and de Palma (2004) approach parking as a common property resource
and they study on the pricing of parking in various dimensions. They mainly focus on
unassigned parking that individuals search around for the usage of shorter time periods.
They are not interested in individuals who have long term contracts to avoid the bother of
daily search of parking. Specifically, their model is designed for individuals who have less
regular trips who do not have regular parking routine such as tourists or shoppers. In the
model, each extra parker increases the others’ search time of parking, and the number of
parkers and number of parking spaces are taken as exogenous. They analyze equilibrium
with underpriced parking, social optimum, and they then compare it with the price of
parking by monopolistically competitive private parking lot operators. Since unassigned
parking spaces are free, parking spaces that are close to the most desirable destination
are over-exploited, and less desirable parking lots are under-used. Therefore, the optimal
pricing includes the externalities of congestion and differentiate among closer and further
locations. They show that the private ownership of parking lots in a market system can
decentralize the optimal configuration under private ownership where parking lots are
priced diversely and in a monopolistically competitive manner.
Anderson and de Palma (2007) extended their model in Andersen and de Palma
(2004). In the model of the latter parking lands are exogenous and people have to park
somewhere; walking to the desired place is not an option. In Anderson and de Palma
(2007) they allow endogenously determined parking land and land rents are determined
in the model. They show that again socially optimum is reached under a monopolistically
competitive market. Moreover, in the equilibrium residents who are close to the city can
walk directly to the desired places without using their cars, while those who come from
far away, drive to a parking space and then walk the remaining distance.
Verhoef (1995), Arnott and Rowse (1999), and Anderson and Palma (2004) analyze
their problemwhen there is no off-street parking market. Caltroph and Proost (2006) think
that eliminating an alternative parking option is restrictive. They focus on regulation of
on-street parking when there is a monopolistic off-street parking option. In their model,
identical individuals such as shoppers or tourists driving to the urban area and search for
a parking space. They have two options; they either park at a private parking facility or
search for an available spot on street. When on-street parking fee is lower than the private
parking fee, people want to search for cheaper spots. If the difference between two options
is higher, more number of individuals want to invest for searching an available spot. They
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find that in the equilibrium government choose on-street parking fee equal to the private
parking fee in order to minimize the search cost. Moreover, they show that this setting is
socially optimal when the supply of private parking space is competitive. They also show
that the optimal price of on-street parking space is equal to marginal cost of private parking
space when the supply of on street parking is sufficiently low relatively to the demand and
the supply of private parking space is competitive. This allocation is also optimal in first
best sense.
Arnott and Inci (2006) is the first attempt to understand and analyze the cruising for
parking from an economic perspective. They construct a simple downtown parking model
that connects saturated (fully occupied) on-street parking and traffic congestion, so that the
number of cars that search for a parking space increase traffic congestion. In their model,
the number of on-street parking spaces and parking duration per trip and trip length are
fixed. There is endogenously determined travel time which contains in-transit travel time
and time spent cruising for parking and it is equally affected by both of them. They show
that it is efficient to set the parking fee at a level where parking is fully occupied without
cruising for parking. On the other hand, they also analyze the steady-state social optimum
for the on-street parking when the level of parking capacity is fixed and variable. In first-
best optimum, on-street parking space should be set at a level that the efficient parking fee
covers the externality of traffic congestion and there is no cruising for parking whether
parking is variable or fixed. In second-best optimum where there is fixed parking fee,
on-street parking space should be set at a level that parking remains fully occupied where
there is no cruising for parking.
According to the economic theory, residential parking permits generally increase
inefficiencies except for some cases such as residents’ willingness to pay for parking is
greater than non-residents. Van Ommeren, Wentink, and Dekkers (2011) estimate the
money that residents want to pay for parking permits and the cost of cruising for residents
in Amsterdam by using the estimates of economic value of on-street private parking and
the data of parking permits waiting lists. Then, they make a comparison between the
estimated money and on-street parking fees that non-residents pay. Their empirical results
show that, an outside parking space increases the value of houses that are close to the
residential parking permits more than the value of houses that are close to the on-street
parking areas. Moreover, they show the amount of money that the marginal resident wants
to pay for a parking permit is approximately 10 euro per day. This is higher than the
amount that residents pay for a parking permit but lower than the on-street parking fee
that a non-residents pay. Therefore, there are high inefficiencies about use of on-street
parking spaces.
Molenda and Sieg (2013) focus on parking behavior of individuals at crowded and
central residential areas, and commercial districts of the cities. Residents who live in
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downtown areas (close to the shopping malls, theaters, office buildings etc.) enjoy the
location advantage of their homes; however they suffer from the difficulty of finding an
available parking slot. In their simple model, there are two types of individuals who are
residents and visitors, and two types of parking options which are parking at parking lots
that is further away from city center or on-street parking that close to residential area
and all the facilities. In the model, their aim is to identify the trade-off between residents’
priority on parking lots and the availability of various products in commercial districts, and
examine the optimal policy of sharing of residential parking spaces from the perspective
of residents and the social planner. They identify under which situations turning on-street
parking spaces into residential parking spaces can be rational. Moreover, they find the
optimal allocation of residential parking areas, and show that when there is privileged
on-street parking for residents, economic efficiency cannot be ensured.
In the literature, downtown parking pricing has more attention than downtown park-
ing capacity. Arnott, Inci, and Rowse (2015) approach differently and focus on the opti-
mal downtown curbside parking allocation when private sector provides parking spaces
(garage parking). They look at the optimal proportion of curbside to be allocated for
parking when there is exogenous curbside parking fee. The first best-optimum results
are straightforward and there is no cruising for parking. Moreover, in the low demand
intensity there is only curbside parking. When demand intensity is sufficiently high i.e.
intermediate, both curbside and garage parking occurs. If demand intensity is very high
then there is only garage parking. In the case that where curbside parking is underpriced
and there is low demand intensity, excess demand occurs. The social surplus is maximized
at a point when the curbside parking capacity increases until excess demand is eliminated
which makes garage parking unprofitable. If demand intensity is very high, the social
surplus is so close to its maximum even there is no curbside parking, and any curbside
allocated to parking increases traffic congestion. Therefore, there is no curbside parking
in the second-best optimum and for the both cases where demand intensity is low or high,
there is no cruising for parking.
3 The Model
In this section, I describe the model and its assumptions. There is a monopolist shopping
mall in a downtown area, and it is owned by amonopolist and risk-neutral mall owner. The
mall sells one good, which has no cost, and at a non negative price, P . Only vehicle that
can be used to come to the mall is a car. The shopping mall provides parking spaces for
shoppers and residents who can use these parking spaces for errands other than shopping.
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The mall decides on the capacity of the parking space, Q. The cost of parking spaces
is defined by a functional form c(Q)2 where c > 0 is a constant coefficient of the cost
function. The intuition behind this cost function depends on the assumption that the cost
of an extra parking space increases with an increasing rate because land is expensive in
downtown areas. The parking fee charged by the mall is t; and all t, P , andQ are common
knowledge; and the mall decides on them.
There are two groups of agents in this model. The first group is consumers who
come for shopping, and the second one is residents. Intuitively, residents are people who
come to the residential area but use parking spaces of the shopping mall. The consumers’
only aim is to shop and go back to their homes after that. For both groups there are two
places to park: they can either park at the shopping mall or curbside. Therefore, there
are four types of individuals according to their parking forms: shoppers who park at the
shopping mall, SM and curbside, SC , and residents who park at the shopping mall, RM
and curbside RC . There is no capacity limit for outside parking area; however, there is an
increasing cost function k(SC + RC)2 for both shoppers and non-shoppers where k > 0
constant coefficient of cost function. When the number of individuals increases in traffic,
both traffic congestion and time spent for cruising for parking increases. Moreover, this
increase in cost is not linear with the increase in the number of individuals; cost rather,
increases at an increasing rate. Lastly, there is a walking cost w for shoppers who park
outside and residents who park at mall. Intuitively, shoppers who park curbside walk to
the mall, and they consider this cost in the parking decision. For example, a family who
comes to buy some furniture from Ikea takes this cost into account. On the other hand,
residents who suffer from cruising for parking may choose to park at the mall, but I cannot
ignore the fact that they have to walk to their home. For example, after a busy day people
may pay a parking fee, and they do not want to deal with traffic congestion. However, if
they consider the distance they will walk, they can change their mind and they may not
want to pay a parking fee and walk after that. Therefore, I include this cost to express this
real life situation.
The value of the good to a shopper is v, which has the cumulative distribution func-
tion F (v) with support [0; v] and the probability density function f(v) > 0. The residents
have the constant utility ofD from their activities. Therefore, the utility of a shopper who
parks at the shopping mall is the difference between his valuation to the good and price of
the good, and the parking fee i:e: V  P t and that for a shopper who parks curbside is the
difference between his valuation to the good and the price of the good and the cost of cruis-
ing for parking and traffic congestion, and the walking cost i:e: V  P k(SC+RC)2 w.
The utility of a resident who parks at the shopping mall is the difference between his utility
D and the parking fee, and the walking cost i:e: D   t   w and that for a resident who
parks curbside is the difference between his utility D and the cost of cruising for parking
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and traffic congestion i:e: D k(SC+RC)2. There isN mass of individual in this model.
N can be identified as people who has car and people have not parked yet at or around
the shopping mall. Since people who come to the mall by walking do not effect traffic
congestion or spillover parking, there is no need to include them. Therefore, this model
focus on decisions of people who have not park yet and make a decision between parking
residential area (curbside) or at the shopping mall, and outcome of their decisions in var-
ious aspects. Overall, the model can be thought as a sequential game. In the first stage,
the shopping mall decides on the price of the good, the parking fee, and the the capacity
of parking space. Then, in the second stage, shoppers and residents choose to park at the
shopping mall or curbside.
3.1 Equilibrium
In this section, I determine the equilibrium price of good, P , the equilibrium quantity of
parking space, Q, and the equilibrium parking fee, t. Furthermore, I determine the dis-
tribution of N mass of individual according to their parking decisions in the equilibrium.
Since, it is a sequential game I will start with the problem of individuals and then continue
with the problem of the mall by applying the backward induction.
3.1.1 Individuals
There are two groups of individuals who are shoppers and residents and they are de-
termined endogenously. These individuals choose to park at the mall or curbside. A
shopper parks at the mall if his utility of parking at the mall is greater than the utility
of parking curbside, i:e: V   P   t > V   P   k(SC + RC)2   w. Similarly, he
parks curbside if his utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of parking at
the mall, i:e: V   P   k(SC + RC)2   w > V   P   t. He is indifferent between
parking at the mall and parking curbside if he has same utilities from both of them, i:e:
V  P t = V  P k(SC+RC)2 w. A resident parks at the mall if his utility of parking
at the mall is greater than the utility of parking curbside, i:e: D t w > D k(SC+RC)2.
Similarly, he parks curbside if his utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of
parking at the mall, i:e: D   k(SC + RC)2 > D   t   w. He is indifferent between
parking at the mall and parking curbside if he has same utilities from both of them, i:e:
D   t  w = D   k(SC +RC)2.
For the equilibrium, there are two possible equilibrium allocations such that either
shoppers or residents are indifferent between parking at the mall and parking curbside, i:e:
either V   P   t = V   P   k(SC + RC)2   w or D   t  w = D   k(SC + RC)2. If
8
neither of the two groups are indifferent, people want to move to other option. Therefore,
there are four possible cases when there is no indifference.
For the first case, if the utility of parking at the mall is higher than the utility of
parking curbside for a shopper i:e: V   P   t > V   P   k(SC + RC)2   w and the
utility of parking curbside is higher than the utility of parking at the mall for a resident
D   t   w < D   k(SC + RC)2, then shoppers want to park at the mall and residents
want to park curbside. Therefore, there will be a reallocation of parking spaces. Thus, this
cannot be an equilibrium.
For the second case, the exact opposite of the previous one, if the utility of parking
at the mall is lower than the utility of parking curbside for a shopper i:e: V   P   t <
V   P   k(SC +RC)2  w and the utility of parking curbside is lower than the utility of
parking at the mall for a resident i:e: D  t w > D  k(SC +RC)2, then shoppers want
to park curbside and residents want to park at the mall. Therefore, again there will be a
reallocation of parking spaces between individuals. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium.
For the third case, if for both of the shoppers and residents, the utility of parking at the
mall is higher than the utility of parking curbside i:e: V  P t > V  P k(SC+RC)2 w
and D   t   w > D   k(SC + RC)2, then all individuals who park at the mall want to
park curbside. Therefore again here we cannot talk about an equilibrium.
For the fourth case, when for both of the shoppers and residents, the utility of parking
at the mall is lower than the utility of parking curbside i:e: V  P   t < V  P   k(SC +
RC)
2 w andD t w < D k(SC+RC)2. This situation cannot occur since a shopping
mall wants to maximize its profit. In this case, the mall has the chance of increasing the
parking fee without losing any customer because even if parking fee is higher individuals
who park at the mall do not want to move by reason of they are still better off. Thus, this
cannot be an equilibrium.
After showing any of the four cases cannot be an equilibrium , I go back for the
two possible equilibrium allocations. The one where shoppers are indifferent between
parking at the mall and curbside i:e: V   P   t = V   P   k(SC + RC)2   w, and the
utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of parking at the mall for a resident
i:e: D   t  w < D   k(SC +RC)2 is the only equilibrium. In Appendix A I show why
the other one cannot be an equilibrium. I find the optimal parking fee t in terms of k, w,
SC , RC by the help of equation
V   P   t = V   P   k(SC +RC)2   w; (1)
and equilibrium parking fee, t in terms of k, w and SC , RC is
t = k(SC +RC)2 + w: (2)
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Notice that I have not determined the equilibrium fee yet. I only find the structure of t.
~v is the point that individuals are indifferent between shopping and going home and
~v = D+P w. It can be also thought as the utility ofmarginal individual who is indifferent
between parking at the mall and curbside. In the equilibrium, F (~v)N individuals are
residents since F (~v)N represents the ratio of individuals who have less utility than the
marginal individual, ~v. Therefore,
RC +RM = F (~v)N: (3)
Since utility of parking curbside is higher than parking at the mall for residents, none of
the residents park at the mall i:e: RM = 0, and thus,
RC = F (~v)N: (4)
(1 F (~v))N individuals are shoppers since (1 F (~v))N represents the ratio of individuals
who have more utility than marginal individual, ~v. Thus,
SC + SM = (1  F (~v))N: (5)
Therefore (2), (4) and (5) are the three equilibrium conditions.
3.1.2 The Mall
After finding the three equilibrium conditions by solving the problem of individuals, I
now go back and solve the problem of the mall. The objective of the mall is maximizing
its profit, and its profit is equal to difference between its gain from selling the product
to shoppers and the parking fee from individuals who park at the mall, and the cost of
building parking space. Therefore, the profit function is
(P; t; Q) = P (SC + SM) + t(Q)  c(Q)2: (6)
by using equilibrium condition (5), (P; t; Q) becomes
(P; t;Q) = P (1  F (~v))N + t(Q)  c(Q)2: (7)
The first order condition with respect to P is
P : (1  F (~v))N + Pf(~v)N: (8)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to P to zero gives the unique equilibrium
price of the good implicitly, P .
P  =
(1  F (~v)
f(~v)
: (9)
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When P increased (1 F (~v)
f(~v)
decreases and when P decreased (1 F (~v)
f(~v)
increases, since the
equality of P  = (1 F (~v)
f(~v)
holds, this yields a contradiction. Therefore, there is a unique
P . The first-order condition with respect to t is
t : Q: (10)
Since Q > 0, the mall wants to increase the parking fee as much as possible, however,
I have already found that the only possible structure of the equilibrium parking fee is
t = k(SC + RC)2 + w. Therefore, after finding the allocation of shoppers and residents
in the equilibrium, I can determine the equilibrium parking fee, t in detail. Lastly, the
first-order condition with respect to Q:
Q : t  2cQ: (11)
Equating first-order condition with respect to Q, to zero gives the equilibrium capacity of
parking space Q:
Q =
t
2c
: (12)
After finding the equilibrium allocation of individuals, I can determine the equilibrium
capacity of parking space in detail, Q.
3.1.3 The Allocation of Individuals at the Equilibrium
The distribution of shoppers and residents are determined in the problem of individuals
part. In this subsection I calculate the proportion of shoppers and residents who park at
mall or curbside. The individuals who park curbside is equal to difference between N
mass of individual and individuals who park at the mall i:e:
SC + SM = N  Q: (13)
By inserting equilibrium condition (2) into expression for equilibrium capacity (12) I get
Q =
k(SC +RC)
2 + w
2c
: (14)
Then, I rewrite equation (13) as
SC +RC = N   k(SC +RC)
2 + w
2c
: (15)
By solving this equation I get individuals who park curbside:
SC +RC =
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   c
k
: (16)
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Since the structure of the equilibrium parking fee is t = k(SC+RC)2+w, the equilibrium
parking fee is
t =
2c
k
(c+ kN  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw): (17)
By using the equilibrium parking fee t, I also get the equilibrium capacity of parking space
since Q = t
2c
. Then, Q:
Q =
c+ kN  pc2 + 2ckN   kw
k
: (18)
By using equilibrium conditions (4) and (5), and equations (16) and (18) I determine the
equilibrium allocation of individuals. The quantity of shoppers who park at the mall is
equal to the capacity of the mall since there are no residents who park at mall in the equi-
librium, SM is
SM =
c+ kN  pc2 + 2ckN   kw
k
= N  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   c
k
: (19)
The quantity of shoppers who park curbside is equal to difference between the total quan-
tity of shoppers and the quantity of shoppers who park at the mall (capacity of the mall),
SC :
SC = (1  F (~v))N   c+ kN  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw
k
=
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   c
k
  F (~v)N:
(20)
The quantity of residents who park at the mall, RM is equal to zero, and quantity of resi-
dents who park curbside, RC is equal to F (~v)N .
3.2 The Social Optimum
In the previous section, I find the equilibrium parking fee, the capacity of parking space
and the price of good, moreover I determine the allocation of individuals in the equilib-
rium. Next question is what will be the second-best socially optimal parking fee that is
chosen by the city in order to maximize social welfare. I use the notion of second-best for
the social optimality because city can only control the parking fee and cannot control the
capacity of parking space at the mall and the price of good. Since the city maximizes the
welfare of the society, the welfare function consists of the summation of the utilities of
individuals, i:e:
vR
~v
(V   P   t)dF (v), F (~v)N(D   t+ w), and the profit of the mall i:e:
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P (1  F (~v))N + t(Q)  c(Q)2:
W (t) =
vZ
~v
(V   P   t)dF (v) + (RC +RM)(D   k(SC +RC)2)
+ P (SC + SM) + t(Q)  c(Q)2:
(21)
Using equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) from problem of the individuals, and optimality
of the parking space (12) from the problem of the mall, the welfare function becomes
W (t) =
vZ
~v
(V   P   t)dF (v) + F (~v)(D   t+ w)
+ P (1  F (~v)) + t
2
2c
  t
2
4c
:
(22)
Since the city controls the parking fee, first-order condition with respect to t, is
Wt =  
vZ
~v
dF (v)  F (~v)N + t
c
  t
2c
: (23)
Equating first order condition with respect to t to zero I get second-best socially optimal
parking fee,
tSO = 2cN: (24)
4 Extensions
The subsections 3.1 and 3.2 derive the main results. In this extension section I differentiate
the base model in some dimensions to argue that there can be alternative policies for the
city, instead of interfering in the shopping mall parking fee. As a first extension I analyze
the parking validation. The parking validation case allows the mall to identify the type of
individuals. Therefore the mall can charge different parking fees. In this case I determine
the parking fees; however, I need to the data to compare with the socially optimal case
where the city decides on the parking fee because change in the parking fee changes the
distribution of individuals unlike the base model. Although I do not use the data, I reach
some important preliminary results for further research. Then, I analyze the situation
where curbside parking is not free and it is controlled by the city. In this second extension
section the city charges a parking fee to individuals who park curbside instead of deciding
the shoppingmall parking fee. In this section I show that the city can also reach the socially
optimal parking fee by using curbside parking fee. Lastly, I extend the base model by
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adding a private parking company that provides parking spaces for individuals. In this
last case, I find that although the welfare of the city’s socially optimal case higher than the
private parking company case, the private parking company makes individuals better off.
4.1 Parking Validation
In this extension part, now the mall can distinguish shoppers and residents. Therefore, the
mall charges two separate parking fees, one for residents tR and one for shoppers tS . The
utility of a shopper who parks at the mall is difference between his valuation to the good
and cost of the good, and parking fee i:e: V  P   tS . The utility when he parks curbside
does not change and it is same as the base model V   P   k(SC +RC)2  w. The utility
of a resident who parks at the mall is difference between his constant utility and parking
fee, and walking cost i:e: D   tR   w, and the utility when he parks curbside again does
not change from the base model and it is D   k(SC + RC)2   w. The indifference point
~v changes in this setting and it becomes ~v = D + P + tS   tR   w. Notice that now ~v
also depends on parking fees. Thus a change in parking fees can change the allocation of
individuals. Here, the profit of the shopping mall is
(P; tS; tR; Q) = P (SM + SC) + tSSM + tRRM   cQ2 (25)
The first-order conditions with respect to P :
P : (1  F (~v))N + Pf(~v)N: (26)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to P , to zero gives the unique equilibrium
price of the good:
P  =
1  F (~v)
f(~v)
: (27)
The first-order conditions with respect to tS:
tS : P ( f(~v))N + SM : (28)
By using P  = 1 F (~v)
f(~v)
, tS becomes
tS : (F (~v)  1)N + SM < 0 (29)
Since (F (~v) 1)N +SM is negative, parking fee for shoppers is equal to zero i:e: tS = 0.
Therefore, the shopping mall charges no parking fee to the shoppers. Then, the first-order
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conditions with respect to tR:
tS : P (f(~v))N +RM : (30)
By using P  = 1 F (v)
f(v)
, then tR becomes
tR : (1  F (~v))N + SM > 0: (31)
Since (F (~v) 1)N+SM is positive, the mall wants to increase parking fee for residents as
much as it can. The only possible equilibrium situation is where residents are indifferent
between parking at the mall and curbside i:e: D  tR w = D  k(SC +RC)2 and utility
of parking at the mall is greater than utility of parking at curbside for the shoppers i:e:
V  P   tS > V  P  k(SC+RC)2 w. Since the shopping mall parking fee is zero the
second one is trivial. For the indifference of residents, if the mall chooses parking fee such
that the utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of parking at the mall, then no
resident park at the mall. Therefore, the mall cannot gain any fee from residents and this
cannot be an equilibrium. If the utility of parking curbside is greater than utility of parking
at the mall then, this means that the mall does not maximize its profit since it can increase
parking fee without losing any individual. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore
the structure of tR is k(SC +RC)2   w. I rewrite the profit function of the mall by using
tS = 0 and writing Q   SM instead of RM to find the capacity. Then, (P; tS; tR; Q)
becomes (P; tR; Q):
(P; tR; Q) = P (SM + SC) + tR(Q  SM)  cQ2 (32)
The first-order conditions with respect to Q:
Q : tR   2cQ: (33)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to Q, to zero I get equilibrium capacity
Q =
tR
2c
: (34)
Summation of shoppers who park at the mall and curbside is equal to total number of
individuals N i:e:
k(SC +RC)
2   w
2c| {z }
SM +RM
+SC +RC = N: (35)
Then, I get people who park curbside;
SC +RC =
p
c2 + 2ckN + kw   c
k
: (36)
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Parking fee for residents tR is
tR =
 2cpc2 + 2ckN + kw + 2c2
k
+ 2w + 2cN: (37)
For a detailed analyze of the parking validation and comparison of it with the socially
optimal case where the city decides parking fee, I need the data. Therefore, I end this part
with some important results that can help a further research. Firstly, when the mall can
identify the individuals as shopper and resident, it does not charge any parking fee to
shoppers. Only residents who park at the mall pay the parking fee. Secondly, the parking
fee for residents is lower than the socially optimal parking fee for high enoughN . Thirdly,
when there is parking validation, there are more shoppers in the society when it compared
with the socially optimal case. Intuitively, free parking for shoppers promote people to
shop. Lastly, in the parking validation case the capacity of the mall is smaller and there are
more individuals who park curbside. Intuitively, when the parking fee decreases the mall
need to decrease the cost of parking space. Therefore, the capacity of the mall decreases
and more people park curbside.
4.2 Curbside Parking Fee
I consider a situation where there exists a curbside parking fee tC , and it is controlled by
the city in order to maximize the social welfare. The utility of residents and shoppers who
park at the mall does not change from the base model, and the utilities areD  t w and
V   P   t. Since residents and shoppers who park curbside pay a curbside parking fee,
their utilities become V   P   k(SC +RC)2   w   tC and D   k(SC +RC)2   tC .
Firstly, problem of the individuals is same as the base model (see section 3.1.1).
Adding tC to curbside cost does not change the equilibrium structure. Therefore, the only
possible equilibrium is where shoppers are indifferent between parking at the mall and
curbside i:e: V  P t = V  P k(SC+RC)2 w tC and the utility of parking curbside
is greater than parking at the mall for residents i:e: D  t w < D  k(SC +RC)2  tC .
Thus, the structure of equilibrium parking fee, t in terms of k, w and SC , RC , tC is:
t = k(SC +RC)2 + w + tC ; (38)
~v does not change since it depends onD, P , andw i:e: v = D+P w. In the equilibrium,
F (~v)N individuals are residents i:e:
RC +RM = F (~v)N; (39)
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and since utility of parking curbside is higher than parking at themall, none of the shoppers
park at mall i:e: RM = 0, and thus
RC = F (~v)N; (40)
and (1  F (~v))N individuals are shoppers i:e:
SC + SM = (1  F (~v))N: (41)
Secondly, problem of the mall, follows the same path as the base model since the
profit function does not change i:e:(P; t; Q) = P (1 F (~v))N+t(Q) c(Q)2. Therefore,
first-order conditions have same results as the equilibrium andP  is unique, themall wants
to increase t as much as it can, and the capacity of the mall is Q = t
2c
. Lastly, I analyze
the allocation of individuals to determine the parking fees. Summation of individuals who
park at the mall and curbside is equal to the total quantity of individuals N , i:e:
SC +RC +Q = N: (42)
By using Q = t
2c
I get
SC +RC +
k(SC +RC)
2 + w + tC
2c| {z }
SM +RM
= N: (43)
From the equation, individuals who park curbside are
SC +RC =
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC   c
k
: (44)
Since the structure of the equilibrium parking fee is t = k(SC + RC)2 + w + tC , the
equilibrium parking fee, t is
t =
2c
k
(c+ kN  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC : (45)
Notice that I find the equilibrium parking fee in terms of curbside parking fee tC . The
equilibrium capacity of parking space in terms of tC is
Q =
c+ kN  pc2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
k
: (46)
I need to analyze the social optimum to determine curbside parking fee tC . The
welfare function that includes the summation of the utilities of individuals, i:e:
vR
~v
(V  P 
t)dF (v) andF (~v)N(D t+w), and the profit of themall i:e: P (1 F (~v))N+t(Q) c(Q)2
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is
W (t; tC) =
vZ
~v
(V   P   t)dF (v) + F (~v)(D   t+ w)
+ P (1  F (~v))N + tQ  cQ2:
(47)
I use t andQ to write the welfare function in terms of tC and maximize welfare function
with respect to tC since the city controls tC , and it wants to maximize the welfare of
society. The welfare function in terms of tC is
W (tC) =
vZ
~v
(V   P   2c
k
(c+ kN  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC))dF (v))
+ F (~v)N(D   2c
k
(c+ kN  
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC) + w)
+ P (1  F (~v))N + (
2c
k
(c+ kN  pc2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC))2
4c
:
(48)
First-order condition with respect to tC is
WtC =  
cp
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
vZ
~v
dF (v)
  cp
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
F (~v)N
  c
k
+
c
k
(c+ kN)p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
:
(49)
By equating the first-order condition with respect to tC , to zero I get
0 =   cNp
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
  c
k
+
c
k
(c+ kN)p
c2 + 2ckN   kw   ktC
: (50)
The curbside parking fee tC is
tC = 2cN   w: (51)
and the shopping mall parking fee t is
t = 2cN: (52)
When the city charges curbside parking fee in order to maximize the social welfare,
the shoppingmall parking fee is equal to 2cN which is same as the socially optimal parking
fee.
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4.3 Private Parking Facility
In this extension part I enlarge the base model by adding an alternative private company
that provides parking space. I analyze the situation where the city controls none of the
parking fees. Then, I compared the welfare under this situation with the socially optimal
case to see that the society is better off or worse off. In this extension model individuals
have three options to park. They can either park at the mall or curbside or the private
parking space. ~v does not change since it depends on D, P , and w i:e: ~v = D + P   w:
There are two types of parking fees. First one is the mall’s parking fee that is charged to
individuals who park at the mall, tM , and second one is the private parking fee, tP , that is
charged to individuals who park at the private parking space, and curbside has no parking
fee. The utility structure of residents and shoppers who park at the mall and curbside are
same with the base model, i:e: D  tM  w, V  P   tM and V  P   k(SC +RC)2 w,
D   k(SC + RC)2. Individuals who park at the private parking space pay tP but they do
not suffer from cruising for parking i:e: k(SC +RC)2. Therefore, utility of a resident who
park at the private parking space RP is D   tP and utility of a shopper who park at the
private parking space SP is V   P   tp   w.
I solve problem of the individuals in two parts. First part is the parking of individuals
between the mall and curbside. This part is same as the equilibrium solution and I reach
the same conclusion. Shoppers are indifferent between parking at the mall and curbside,
and utility of parking curbside is greater than utility of parking at the mall for a resident
i:e: V   P   tM = V   P   k(SC +RC)2   w and D   tM   w < D   k(SC +RC)2.
Therefore, there is no resident who parks at the mall as the equilibrium. Then, I analyze
the parking of individuals between curbside and the private parking space. Only possible
equilibrium is where both shoppers and residents are indifferent between parking curbside
and at the private parking space i:e: V   P   k(SC +RC)2   w = V   P   tp   w and
D  k(SC +RC)2 = D  tp. If the utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of
parking at the private parking space, then no one parks at the private parking space. Thus
this cannot be an equilibrium. If the utility of parking curbside is lower than the utility
of parking at the private parking space, this means that private parking company does not
maximize its profit because it can increase its parking fee without loss of any customer.
Thus, again this cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, private parking fee tP is equal to
k(SC + RC)
2 and shopping mall’s parking fee tM is equal to k(SC + RC)2 + w in the
equilibrium.
I move on the problem of the mall and profit function of the mall (P; tM ; QM) is
(P; tM ; Q) = P (SC + SM + SP ) + tM(Q)  c(Q)2: (53)
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I rewrite it by using equilibrium condition of shoppers, i:e: SC + SM + SP = 1  F (~v):
(P; tM ; Q) = P (1  F (v))N + tM(Q)  c(Q)2: (54)
The first order condition with respect to P is
P : (1  F (~v))N + Pf(~v)N: (55)
Equating the first-order condition with respect to P to zero gives the unique equilibrium
price of the good,
P  =
1  F (~v)
f(~v)
: (56)
The first-order condition with respect to tM is
t : QM : (57)
Since QM > 0, the mall wants to increase parking fee as much as possible, however, the
structure of equilibrium parking fee for the mall is k(SC + RC)2 + w. Therefore, after
finding the allocation of shoppers and residents in the equilibrium, I can determine the
equilibrium parking fee, tM in detail. Lastly, the first-order condition with respect to Q:
QM : tM   2cQ: (58)
By equating first-order condition with respect toQM , to zero gives the equilibrium capac-
ity of parking space QM is
QM =
tM
2c
: (59)
Now, I move on the problem for private parking company. The profit function of private
parking company (tP ; QP ) is
(tP ; QP ) = tP (RP + SP )  c(QP )2: (60)
The first-order condition with respect to tP is
t : RP + SP : (61)
Since RP + SP > 0, the private parking company wants to increase parking fee as much
as possible, however, the structure of equilibrium parking fee for the company is k(SC +
RC)
2. Again, I need to find the allocation of individuals to determine the parking fee, tP
in detail. The first-order condition with respect to QP is
QP : tP   2cQP : (62)
Equating first-order condition with respect to Q, to zero gives the equilibrium capacity of
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private parking space QP is
QP =
tP
2c
: (63)
The summation of shoppers and residents who park at the mall and curbside and at the
private parking space is equal to total number of individuals N. Since there is no resident
who parks at the mall, then I have the equation:
k(SC +RC)
2 + w
2c| {z }
SM
+SC +RC +
k(SC +RC)
2
2c| {z }
SP +RP
= N: (64)
By solving the equation, individuals who park curbside are
SC +RC =
p 2wk + c2 + 4ckN   c
2k
: (65)
Then, the shopping mall parking fee and the private parking space fees are
tM =
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2 + wk + 2ckN
2k
: (66)
tP =
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2   wk + 2ckN
2k
: (67)
Now I need to compare the welfare when the city decides the shopping mall parking
fee and when there is a private parking company. After this comparison I can argue how a
private parking company affect the society. To make a comparison, I analyze the change
in the welfare between two cases. The change in the welfare, W is equal to difference
between the utilities of shoppers US , residents UR, and the mall UM when the city
decides the shopping mall parking fee and when there exists a private parking company.
In addition to the differences between the two cases, now I add the profit of private parking
company for the private parking company case. Therefore W is
W = US(1  F (~v)N +URF (~v)N +UM + UP : (68)
The change in the utility of a shopper US , is equal to difference between utilities in the
two cases i:e: V  P  tSO (V  P  tM) thusUS is equal to tM tSO. Then, similarly
the change in the utility of a resident UR, is equal to difference between utilities in the
two cases i:e: D   tSO + w   (D   tP + w) thus UR is equal to tP   tSO. The change
in the profit of the mall, , is equal to difference between profits in the two cases i:e:
P (1 F (~v))N + (tSO)2
2c
  c( tSO
2c
)2  [P (1 F (~v))N + (tM )2
2c
  c( tM
2c
)2] and is equal to
t2SO t2M
4c
. Lastly, the profit of private parking company P is tP (RP + SP ). I rewrite the
welfare function and it is
W = (tM   tSO)(1 F (~v))N +(tP   tSO)F (~v)N + t
2
SO   t2M
4c
+ tP (RP +SP ): (69)
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By using tP =  c
p 2wk+c2+4ckN+c2 wk+2ckN
2k
, tM =  c
p 2wk+c2+4ckN+c2+wk+2ckN
2k
, and
tSO = 2cN the welfare function becomes
W = (
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2 + wk
2k
  cN)(1  F (~v))N
+ (
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2 + wk
2k
  cN)F (~v)N
+
(cN    c
p 2wk+c2+4ckN+c2+wk
2k
)(3cN +  c
p 2wk+c2+4ckN+c2+wk
2k
)
4c
+
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2 + wk + 2cN
2k
(
 cp 2wk + c2 + 4ckN + c2 + wk + 2cN
4ck
):
(70)
lim(W )→+∞whenN→+∞. This results show that for high enoughN , the welfare
when there is a private parking company is lower than the welfare when the city decides
on the parking fee. Therefore we can say that for high enough population a private parking
space is not a better alternative. Moreover, for high enough N, the shopping mall parking
fee tM is smaller than the socially optimal parking fee, tSO, and the private parking fee, tP ,
is smaller than the shopping mall’s parking fee, tM i:e: tP < tM < t < tSO. Although
the private parking space is not socially optimal, it makes individuals better off.
5 Conclusion
I construct a model that represents a real life problem between the city, individuals, and
shopping malls. I argue this conflict in an economical perspective and find an alternative
policy. In the model that I constructed, individuals make a decision about where they park
their cars and the shopping mall controls the parking fee, the good that it produced, and
the capacity of the mall. I reach three main results in this paper. Firstly the equilibrium
parking fee when there is no intervention by the city is positive and it is equal to 2c
k
(c +
kN   pc2 + 2ckN   kw) which depends on c, k, N , and w. Secondly, when the city
decides on the parking fee in order to maximize social welfare as in real life case, the
socially optimal parking fee is positive and it is equal to 2cN which depends c andN . This
shows that socially optimal parking fee should be positive unlike the city’s free parking
fee policy in the real situation. Moreover, for high enoughN the socially optimal parking
fee is higher than the equilibrium parking fee. Therefore, this result suggests that instead
of decreasing the parking fee, the city should increase it to make the society better off.
In the extensions part, I extend the model in various ways to see are there any possi-
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ble alternative policies to improve the social welfare. I find the last main result by adding
a curbside parking fee to the base model. When the city controls the curbside parking fee
in order to maximize social welfare, the shopping mall parking fee is same as the socially
optimal parking fee i:e: 2cN . Therefore, the city does not need to force the shopping mall
for any certain parking fee. By controlling the curbside parking fee, the socially optimal
parking fee can be reached without any intervention.
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Appendix A
There are two possible cases for the equilibrium structure. The first case is where
shoppers are indifferent between parking at the mall and curbside i:e: V  P t = V  P 
k(SC+RC)
2 w, and the utility of parking curbside is greater than the utility of parking at
mall for a resident i:e: D t w < D k(SC+RC)2 , and the second case where residents
are indifferent between parking at the mall and curbside i:e: D t w = D k(SC+RC)2,
and the utility of parking at the mall is greater than the utility of parking curbside for a
shopper i:e: V  P   t > V  P  k(SC+RC)2 w. To see the superiority I compare the
profits of the mall for the two cases. The structure of parking fee is k(SC +RC)2 +w for
the first case and k(SC +RC)2  w for the second case, i:e: te1 = k(SC +RC)2 +w and
te2 = k(SC +RC)
2  w. The capacities for the two cases are in the structure of Q = t
2c
,
i:e: Qe1 = t
e1
2c
and Qe2 = te2
2c
. Then the profit of the mall is
(P; t; Q) = P (1  F (~v))N + t(Q)  c(Q): (71)
By using Qe1 = te1
2c
and te1 = k(SC +RC)2 + w, profit of the mall for the first case is

0
(P; t;Q) = P (1  F (~v))N + (k(SC +RC)2 + w)(k(SC +RC)
2 + w
2c
)
  c(k(SC +RC)
2 + w
2c
)2:
(72)
From the section 3.1.4 SC +RC = (
p
c2+2ckN kw c
k

0
(P; t;Q) = P (1  F (~v))N + (k(
p
c2+2ckN kw c
k
)2 + w)2
4c
: (73)
Before writing the profit of the mall for the second case, I need to find the quantity
individuals who park curbside for the second case. Individuals who park curbside is equal
to difference between N mass of individual and the capacity of the mall i:e:
SC +RC = N   k(SC +RC)
2   w
2c
: (74)
From equation 74, SC +RC =
p
c2+2ckN+kw c
k
. Then, the profit of the mall for the second
case is

00
(P; t; Q) = P (1  F (~v))N + (k(
p
c2+2ckN+kw c
k
)2   w)2
4c
: (75)
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Now I can prove that the first case is the equilibrium i:e:

0
(P; t; Q) > 
00
(P; t;Q); (76)
and
P (1 F (~v))N+(k(
p
c2+2ckN kw c
k
)2 + w)2
4c
> P (1 F (~v))N+(k(
p
c2+2ckN+kw c
k
)2   w)2
4c
:
(77)
Since valuation for the good V , constant utility of not shopping D, and the walking cost
w, do not change for the two cases, also price of the product P , and indifference point v,
do not change. Therefore inequality 77 becomes
(k(
p
c2+2ckN kw c
k
)2 + w)2
4c
>
(k(
p
c2+2ckN+kw c
k
)2   w)2
4c
: (78)
When the inequality 78 is simplified it becomes
p
c2 + 2ckN + kw >
p
c2 + 2ckN   kw: (79)
Inequality 79 shows that Inequality 76 holds and the first case has higher profit for the
mall. Therefore the first case is the equilibrium and the mall determines the parking fee
as k(SC +RC)2 + w.
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